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Workmen's Compensation—Heart Cases—Compensation on Basis of
Mental Disturbance and Emotional Strain.—Kiimas v. Trans-Caribbean
Airways, Inc.1—An airlines executive, 33 years of age, with no prior cardiac
history, suffered a fatal heart attack while out of state attempting to ex-
pedite the repair and return to service of a $1,500,000 aircraft, the grounding
of which five months earlier had been attributed to decedent's "sheer neg-
ligence" by the company president. His efforts were intensified just prior
to his death with long hours of fruitless price negotiations attempting to
reduce a $266,000 repair bill in order to release the overdue aircraft for
service. On the morning of his demise he was greatly depressed and ag-
gravated, and, with fear, he communicated with his vice-president in a
forty minute long distance telephone conversation apparently giving assur-
ances of which he had little hope. The Appellate Division found that the
record contained substantial medical testimony (including that of an im-
partial specialist) connecting decedent's heart attack to the emotional stress
of his work, i.e., the "severe and protracted state of emotional upset" which
"reached a climax" during the three day period immediately preceding his
death. Nevertheless, the court reversed the Workmen's Compensation
Board's award of death benefits in favor of claimant, holding that, in the
absence of a showing of any physical strain, an industrial accident cannot
be made out. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the award.
HELD: Death from a heart attack occasioned solely by mental disturbances
and emotional strain resulting from employment is compensable within the
meaning and scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law when, as here,
the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment and that
the death was causally related to such accident.
In a strong dissenting opinion Chief Justice Desmond characterized
the majority view as unprecedented in the absence of any physical exertion
and not an industrial accident in any real objective sense? Yet a foundation
for the Klimas case has an established place in the law, the anatomy of
which has long been permeating legal decisions. Extreme worry° and
emotional stress' as supporting causative elements and emotional strain5
and over-exertion° as primary causative elements have been the basis of
1 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961).
2 176 N.E.2d at 718.
3 Roberts v. Kennedy Valve Mfg. Co., 274 App. Div. 866, 82 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1948),
where a fatal heart attack was compensated on a finding of confusion, nervousness,
and extreme worry; see McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 32, 116 N.E.2d 847, 849
(1954), where the court stated "... we perceive no difference between a stress or strain
brought about by physical exertion and that occasioned by distress, worry, fear or
anxiety...."
4 Brown's Case, 334 Mass. 343, 135 N.E.2d 669 (1956) (physical and mental
strain); Schechter v. State Ins, Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959) (emotional
and physical stress).
5 In Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960),
the court held compensable an employee's collapse from emotional strain and pressure, a
result of his inability to keep pace with his new job on an assembly line; and see
Church v. County of Westchester, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
6 Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745
(1948), motion for leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 759, 90 N.E.2d 901 (1948), where
the court held as compensable a heart attack of a 24-year-old construction supervisor
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Workmen's Compensation awards both in New York and elsewhere. In
Church v. County of Westchester,7 the decedent's only physical exertion
was his uncomfortable twisting on the witness stand under rigorous cross
examination, and, as in the Klimas case, the New York court held on the
basis of competent medical testimony that the mental stress was the cause
of the fatal heart attack, and, therefore, compensable. Further support
for the Klimas decision was supplied by the California court in Fireman's
Fund Indem. Co. v. I.A.C.,8 which held that a stroke and paralysis caused
by 65 days of tension while negotiating labor contracts was compensable.
That a problem exists in this area, however, has been evidenced by a
similar line of cases where opposite results have been reached. Either the
worry was not believed to be sufficient,° the medical testimony was con-
flicting° or the exertion considered no greater than the ordinary wear
and tear of life." The problem becomes more obvious from a reading of
the Workmen's Compensation Laws. Nowhere is there a requirement of
a physical exertion,12 the basic test being an "accidental injury arising
out of and in the course of employment."° As a consequence, the judicial
interpretations that followed the adoption of the acts gave rise to a series
of subtle distinctions which have been applied as rules of law. Perhaps
the most tenacious was the usual-exertion rule." That such a strict
rule of law is untenable is best illustrated by the award of compensation to
the employee who suffered a heart attack as a result of carrying fifteen
pound containers of ice cream where this was considered unusual for a
which medical testimony indicated was the result of his over exertion from working
long hours over an extended period of time.
7 Supra note 5.
8 241 P.2d 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), aff'd, 39 Ca1.2d 831, 250 P.2d 148
(1952).
9 See, e.g., Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 110 Ohio 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
18 Stang v. J. Pechman & Co., 7 App. Div.2d 245, 181 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1959);
Wade v. Woodside Farms, Inc., 2 App. Div.2d 625, 151 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1956).
11 In Stang V. J. Pechman & Co., supra note 10, the court denied compensation to
an employee who suffered emotional strain, a heart attack and death as a result of
having to change a number of invoices, holding his activity involved no more than the
ordinary wear and tear of life. Accord, Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 160 N.Y.S.2d
853 (1957).
72 See Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947), for a discussion of the
Massachusetts statute which awards compensation for personal injury arising out of and
in the course of employment.
73 N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 2(7).
74 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 37.30 at 513 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as 1 Larson]: ". . . once you read accidental as meaning 'by an accident' it is
natural to begin to look for some single incident or event and this is precisely what many
courts have done . . . the greatest source of controversy, however, lies in the accidental—
cause versus accidental—result problem. Its most familiar manifestation is the usual—
exertion case" The rule was established in New York in Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241
N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925), requiring an accident be assignable to both a single
act identified in space or time and a catastrophic or extraordinary event. It should be
noted that Massachusetts has not been faced with this problem merely by reason of the
fact that the Massachusetts statute calls for a "personal" injury and not an "accidental"
injury.
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sales representative of the company," and the denial of compensation to the
mailman who suffered a like attack in lifting two hundred pounds of mail."
In spite of the shortcomings of such a rule, twenty-five years were to elapse
before Chief Justice Loughran's famous statement in Masse v. James H.
Robinson,17 "whether a particular event was an industrial accident is to be
determined not by any legal definition, but by the common sense viewpoint
of the average man,"" reduced the rule to its proper perspective, that
of a question of fact." It should be noted that this judicial evolution was
unnecessary, for well before any American state copied the injury by
accident terminology of the British Act,2° it was settled beyond question
in England that such a claim was compensable on the theory that, although
the cause was routine and not accidental, the effect on the employee was
accidental in that it was unexpected and catastrophic.21 But, notwith-
standing the settled doctrine that, in adopting a statute, the adoption extends
to any authoritative judicial construction,22 the American courts have forced
a running battle with this very issue which is still being fought.23
It appears antithetical that Chief Justice Desmond should concede the
progress made in the Masse case and yet still require an "industrial accident
in some real objective sense."24 Apparently he is still clinging to the
judicial subleties resorted to in heart cases because of their generalized
nature which, it has been said, makes it difficult factually to attribute the
15 Philadelphia Dairy Products Co. v. Farran, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 380, 57 A.2d 88
(1948), aff'd, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 437, 61 A.2d 400 (1948).
16 Marlow v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 250 NM. 130 (1935).
17 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
18 Id. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57.
13 See, e.g., McMurray's Case, supra note 3, where the court stated that whether
the employee's death was caused by a gradual degeneration of his cardiac organs or
was accelerated by a strain attributable to his work on that particular day is a
question of fact for the board to decide.
20 Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vitt., c. 37,
	 1(1) (repealed).
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, 1(1) (repealed).
21 Fenton v. Thorley, [1903l A.C. 443; and see Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes,
[19103 A.C. 242, where a routine exertion of tightening a nut causing an aneurism to
break was held to be an injury by accident and compensable.
22 Fuller—Toponee Truck Co. v. Public Service Commission, 99 Ufah 28, 96
P.2d 722 (1939).
23 New Jersey has been going through a judicial evolution similar to that of
New York. See the discussion of Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141
A.2d 761 (1958), in 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 390, 391 (1958), wherein the writer concluded
that "the unusual strain doctrine has been laid in a shallow grave from which its ghost
may be expected to emerge at any time." For a treatment of this evolutionary process
in reverse, see the fairly recent Washington developments; Washington, like Massachu-
setts, had no accident requirement in their compensation act, and thus the court had
defined injury in McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries,
7 Wash. 2d 40, 108 P.2d 807 (1941), as an accident which arises out of employment
when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking
the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of the workman's health.
This is also the state of the law in Georgia as defined in Williams v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1942). However, the Washington rule was
abrogated in Windhurst v. Department of Labor & Industries, 52 Wash.2d 33, 323
P.2d 241 (1958), requiring now an "unusual strain."
24 Supra note 1, 176 N.E.2d at 718.
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attack to the work,25 or because of the judicially declared presumption that
death from heart disease is ordinarily the result of natural physiological
causes rather than trauma or particular effort." Perhaps it is because of the
often repeated assertion that to compensate such cases would be to make
compensation law the equivalent of life and health insurance.27 Whatever
the reason, the Klima: decision clearly brought reason to bear on the basic
issue. The focal point for judicial review is not the accidental character
of the mishap, but rather the medico-legal question of causation." This
was recognized in the Church case where compensation was awarded on
the basis of competent medical testimony that the death was a natural and
unavoidable result. Similar testimony was given in the Klimas case and
was not disputed." As succinctly stated by Professor Larson:
These decisions do not stand for the proposition that every heart
failure becomes an accident just because it happens. There must
still be an unexpected result and there must be an exertion—some
exertion—capable medically of causing the collapse.... The natural
progress of the disease may bring it to its fatal climax during
working hours but if the employee's activity at that time involves
no effort, or effort which can support medically a causal connection,
it can rightly be said that the outcome was neither accidental nor
causally related to employment.30
The rationality and propriety of this medico-legal causation theory
is further supported by the social philosophy of compensation law itself.
The basic test of liability is whether there was a work connected injury,
i.e., arising out of and in the course of employment, with no reference to
the personal conduct or merits of the parties. Thus, the test is not a
matter of assessing blame but of marking out boundaries. Negligence and,
for the most part, fault are not in issue and cannot affect the results'
29 Kayser v. Erie County Highway Department, 276 App. Div. 789, 92 N.Y.S.2d
612 (1949).
26 Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.J. Super. 56, 80 A.2d 235 (1951).
21 Supra note 1, 176 N.E.2d at 718; 1 Larson
	 1.20; accord, McLaughlin,
Compensability of Heart Injuries Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
Act, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 445, 448 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin].
28 1 Larson IS 38.83; Schechter v. State Insurance Fund, supra note 4, where the
court stated that the stress of the unusual exertion must be causally related to the
infarction and that this is a problem of medical causality. Accord, LeBlanc's Case,
334 Mass. 265, 134 N.E.2d 900 (1956), holding whether death was due to heart
disease in its usual course or whether death came sooner than it otherwise would have
because of employment was a matter for experts in medical science and that in light of
such evidence the claimant must prove causation by a fair preponderance of the
evidence
29 Supra note I, 176 N.E.2d at 715.
80 I Larson * 38.83 at 565; and see Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 495, 111 N.E.2d
379, 382 (1916):
Not every diseased person suffering a misfortune at work is entitled to com-
pensation. The relief is so new that the tendency may be to inquire only as to
the employment and to assume that these two facts constitute ground for
compensation. But the essential connecting link of direct causal connection
must be established before the Act becomes operative. . .
81 1 Larson 2; and see Madden's Case, supra note 30, at 494, Ill N.E.2d at 382:
It is the injury arising out of the employment and not out of the disease of the
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Some writers refer to compensation law as a form of strict liability,32
but this cannot be equated to strict tort liability. Proof of this is the
retention of the defenses of act of God, act of third parties, and some
forms of contributory negligence in strict tort liability and their unavail-
ability in compensation law, indicating that the former is ultimately based
on fault while the latter is not. Further, Workmen's Compensation injuries
include only those which produce disability and thereby personally affect
earning power. The claimant is not reimbursed for his loss, as in tort law,
but is merely given a sum which when added to his remaining earning
ability, if any, will enable him to exist without becoming a burden to
others.33 It is not a substitute for disability or old age pensions nor can it
be strained to include such coverage." Thus, it can be seen that any
application of strict legal rules will only tend to frustrate the basic tenets
of this system of social protection." As a "system" and not as an adversary
contest, its ultimate purpose is to treat the personal injuries incident to
employment as a part of the cost of doing business." To recite the old
campaign slogan: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workmen."37 Moreover, this philosophy is not purely academic, con-
stituting as it did, one of the major determinants in Carter v. General
Motors Corp."
In view of the above, it would appear that it is not the decision in
the Klimas case that is unprecedented but merely the fact situation. The
result reached by the court is not an extension of compensation coverage
as concluded by the dissent, but rather is the ultimate extension of a factual
problem dealing with heart cases in which physical exertion is not in issue.
The decision, suited as it is to the needs of the day, is a much needed,
modern reaffirmation of the Masse case. It not only sustains the adequacy of
the judicial process in deciding cases involving this basic problem of causal-
ity, but it synthesizes the aforementioned anatomical complex of law existing
in this area. This is significant because the coverage of heart cases is
purely the result of judicial interpretation and because the problem is
more often than not ultimately analyzed as a function for the legislature."
employee for which compensation is to be made. Yet it is the hazard of the
employment acting upon the particular employee in his condition of health and
not what the hazard would be if acting upon a healthy employee or upon the
average employee. The Act makes no distinction between wise or foolish, skilled
or experienced, healthy or diseased employees. All who are describable as em-
ployees come within the Act.
32 Prosser, Torts 383 (2d ed. 1955).
33 1 Larson 2.
34 Madden's Case, supra note 30.
35 See the discussion of the Carter case, supra note 5, as noted in 6 VIII. L. Rev.
434 (1961), which sustains the view that "compensation laws were passed for the
beneficient purpose of attaining a humanitarian end which had hitherto been frustrated
by the inexorable rules of the common law," citing A. Wilson & Co. v. Matthews, 170
Va. 164, 165, 195 S.E. 490, 491 (1938), and generally, 1 Schneider, Workmen's
Compensation Law, 1-10 (2d ed. 1932).
36 Supra note 34.
37 Supra note 32.
38 Supra note 5.
39 McLaughlin at 489-92.
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Such was Chief Justice Desmond's conclusion.40 Whether further judicial
interpretation of additional legislation will resolve the problem is a question
that need not be answered. As long as the problem is a medico-legal question
of causality between employment and injury it will, of necessity, involve
Judge Loughran's "question of fact" to be answered in the light of existing
conditions, medical knowledge, and social responsibility. The Klimas
decision was, therefore, a proper application of a judicial trend within this
framework. It is a trend which requires flexible court room guide lines
and not confining labels of law. The causation theory is not problem-free,41
but in an increasingly complex and dynamic society it possesses a very prac-
tical attribute of workability.
JOHN R. MURPHY
40 Supra note 1, at 719.
41 It is convenient to assume that since an attack followed exertion the exertion
must have caused the attack. Unfortunately the matter is not so simple for the
heart specialist. It is known that many attacks of coronary thrombosis occur
when the patient is at complete rest, the reason being the tendency of blood to
clot at low flow rate at the site of the damage to the artery lining. Even if
exertion is a factor, how much is required is another problem. In other words,
the more the expert witness may know of the heart and its disease, the more
difficult it may become for him in individual cases to find causality in exertion.
McLaughlin at 452.
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